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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
WA E. CARROLL and :MARY vV. 
CARROLL, husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
vs. 
PHIL M. BIRDSALL and l\L 
LaVERNE BIRDSALL, husband and 
wife, 
Def endants-Appellamts. 
APPELLANTS' BRIEF 
Case No. 
11854 
STArrEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
rl'hi8 is an action by Plaintiffs-Respondents, as 
sellers on a Uniform Real Estate Contract, to repossess 
n·al Pstate from the Defendants - Appellants, buyers on 
said Unifonn Real Esfate Contract. It is also an action 
Rreking attorney's fees pursuant to the terms of said 
eontract, and is an action for treble damages under the 
provisions of Chapter 36, Title 78, Utah Code Anno-
tatPd, for any unlawful withholding of said real estate. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
After a non-jury trial on the merits, the lower court 
grantPd judgmt>nt to th(" Plaintiff8. rrlw lower court 
found Defendants in default on the Contract and gave 
2 
judgment awarding tli<• Plaintiffs i1111nPdiat<· J'('"t't 1: ,, l l1 :Id' 
of tlw rPa.l <'stat<> in q:1estio11, and !1niet<'d titlP rn ti:• 
Plaintiffs. Also, Plaintiffs "<'J e awai·ded .irnlgmPnt fr., 
$85.00 per month l'<'n t from March 13, 19(iS, the day fui 
lo-w'ing the servic<· of the N otict> to Pa>- or Quit, : 
initiated these proceedings, to and including thL· 1st dir , 
of July, 19G9, the da:· pre{·eding the concln:,;ion of tl;e 
trial proceedings herein. In addition, the low0r cour' 
awarded $8.50 lWl' day rent from tlw 2nd day of Jn!; 
19G9, to and including the day that the Def Pndants quii 
the property. 
REL1E1'' SOUGHrr ON APPEAL 
Dt>fondanh; seek rvversal of the judgment, and Sl'l'K 
revie'v h,\' the appt>llate court of the evidence of reconl 
Defendants further s<·ek a determination by the appellate 
court that the Uniform Real Estate Contract in questio:, 
was not in default at the time the Plaintiffs commenct1l 
their action; a determinatiou of what tlw 
contract balance was at the time the repossession arni 
unlawful d<:>tainer action was emmnenet>d; au award o: 
attorney's fees and eosts in this case to the Defendant; 
a detennination that the attorney\; fees and costs awaro 
able to D<>fendants are an allowable off-set against an'. 
payments Defendanb should have made on the mon 
gage subsequent to the commencement of the action 1'· 
question; a deterrn ination that the costs allowrd ili 
d there Plaintiffs by the low(•r court are improper an ' · 
fore, disallowed; a determination that Def 
t' a1' entitled to possession of the premises in ques ion. , 
that the Writ of Restitution be immediately vacated; a 
Jdermination that title to said premises be quieted in 
tlw lM't>ndanh;, and that Plaintiffs he compelled to deed 
property to the Defendants; and a determination 
that the case be remanded to the trial court to determine 
Khat the outstanding mortgage indebtedness is against 
property, and after com;idering attorney's fees and 
costs, direct the lower court to determine whether or not 
then· is a deficiency in favor of Plaintiffs, or whether 
or not there might be monies owing the Defendants. 
Should the evidence be such that there would be a de-
ficiency owing in favoT of Plaintiffs, then Defendants 
oeek an order of the appellate court directing the lower 
il conrt to satisfy said deficiency ont of funds now on 
:·il de.posit with the Salt Lake County Clerk. Should there 
be monies owing the Defendants, then they seek an order 
10 , 
1 
of the appellate court directing the lower court to im-
i press a lien against escrow funds in the account of the 
tli1 1 Plaintiffs with Doxey-Layton Company, and to enter 
lo: 
nt;. 
Judgment against the Plaintiffs for any additional funds 
owing the Defendants. 
ard In the event the appellate court finds the weight 
ant of the evidence and the issues against the Defondants-
1orl Appellants, then said Defendants seek release of the 
,nu funds on deposit with the Salt Lake County Clerk, and 
I th an order directing said Clerk to pay said funds over 
here to the Defendants. In addition, the Defendants-Appel-
' lunts would also request that a jndg111ent be entered 
• an,, against the Plaintiff-Respondents, in the amount the 
4 
payments on the ('On tract by the Defendants exceeds thP 
reasonable rental value of the property. 
STATEMJDNT OF FACTS 
Plaintiffs 8old Defendants their home on a 1Inifon11 
Real Estate Contract, dated July 1, 1954. The sale prir·p 
was $11,950.00. Said Contract reserved monthly ]Jay 
ments of $100.00 (R. 3). 
On March 12, 19G8, the Plaintiffa caused to be serveri 
on the Defendant .M. La Verne Birdsall a notice winch 
put the Defendants on notice that tht•y were delinquPn! 
in their monthly payments $2,175.00, and the 
were further notified that the balance on the contract 
as of December 5, 1967, was in the amount of $4,740 . .U. 
The Defendants were required by said notice to bring 
current the debnquent payments on or before .March 
1968, and pay "a reasonable attorney's fee of $475.50." 
(Emphasis added.) A::-1 an alternati\'e thereto, the De· 
f endants were given the option to give up possession of 
the subject property and forfeit all pa)111ents ma<le 
thereon as liquidated damages to the Plaintiffs (R. 4). 
A copy of said notice was personally served on the De· 
fendant M. La Verne Birdsall (R. 5), and a copy thereof 
was left for Defendant Phil M. Birdsall by lea ring same j 
with Defendant M. La Verne Birdsall. A copy thereol 1 
· B' dsall was not mailed addressed to Defendant Phil M. ir 
at his place of residence or his place of business (R 01· 
' I' 11farch ·.v. A second notice was served on Defendants on 11 .• 
t tl r1re1n1se· 1968, notifying the Defendants to vaca e 1e 
i 
I 
I 
I .......... 
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(R. 7). Although the record discloses that both Defend-
ants were served the second notice (R. 8), the 
on the second notice was effected in the same 
manner as was the service of the first notice, with no 
personal service being made on Defendant Phil M. Bird-
sal, and with no mailing being made to said Defendant. 
As of March 12, 1968, the Defendants should have 
paid monthly payments under the terms of the Contract 
(R. 3) in the total amount of $17,000.00, exclusive of 
(axes and insurance. A careful review of all of the 
accountings on file in this case will show that the 
fendants had paid in excess of $17,000.00 on the Con-
tract at the date they were given Notice to Pay or Quit 
(app. I). On that date, according to Lionel M. Farr, 
attorney for Plaintiffs, Defendants were indebted to 
Plaintiffs in the amount of $4,102.06 (Ex. 42-P & app. 
Il). According to Lorin Blauer, the clerk who did the 
accounting for the Defendants, the Defendants were in-
debted to the Plaintiffs in the amount of $2,792.71 (Ex. 
32-D & app. II). Defendants respectfuly submit that the 
appropriate adjusted contract balance as of that same 
date would more closely approximate $3,350.44 ( app. 
lII). There was an outstanding mortgage against the 
premises on which at that date the Plaintiffs owed Doxey-
Layton Company the amount of $3,647.39 (Ex. 31-D). 
Rad the Defendants paid the Plaintiffs rents on the 
property in question, they would have paid $14,025.00 
from the date of the Contract to the date of the first 
notice, assuming a monthly rental rate of $85.00 per 
6 
rnonth and a total of $11,550.00, assuming a montlih 
rental rate of $70.00 per month (app. I). 
By letter dated April 8, 1968, this author, 
for the Defendants, advised Mr. Lionel M. Farr, atto;. 
ney for the Plaintiffs, that the amount sought to he 
recovered by the Plaintiffs was greatly in dispute and 
that an accounting was desired before any conclusiono 
could be made ( R. 10). Notwithstanding Defendants' 
efforts to affect a reconciliation of the problC'm through 
a proper accounting, Plaintiffs conunenced action in this 
case on April 15, 1968, seeking repossession of the pro]J-
erty, treble damages, and attorney's fees (R. 2). On 
April 23, 19G8, the Def t>ndants filed a responsive plea-0-
ing in which, among other things, they asserted the legal 
insufficiency of the Notices to Quit, denied the entitle-
ment of the Plaintiffs to treble damages, denied the 
Plaintiffs' right to an attorney's fee, and plead facts to 
support the conclusion that the Plaintiffs were not en-
titled to repossession of the premises in question (R. 9-
11). In addition, by way of counterclaim filed the same 
date, Defendants generally asserted their right to have 
an accounting in this case and, that at the conclusion of 
such an accounting, that the Court grant appropriat" 
relief to the parties to afford reasonable protection of ! 
the rights of the respective parties, without permitting I 
an unconscionable forfeiture to take place (R. 12-15). 1 
Judge Stewart M. Hanson announced at the com,: 
mencement of the trial of this case on the llt11 day oi I 
all . penml a June, 1969, that the Court could not ow 01 
I 
I ..... 
7 
forfeiture by the Defendants of their interest in the 
real estate, as snch would be an unconscionable forfeiture. 
Judge Hanson reiterated this point throughout the 
and finally memorialized that conclusion in writing by 
the execution and filing of a Memorandum Decision on 
.fuly 2, 1969. The Court in its written Memorandum 
Decision concluded that the Defendants were indebted to 
the Plaintiffs in the amount of $4,133.24 on the Contract, 
and that the Defendants were in d<•fault on said Contract; 
however, the Court found that it would be an uncon-
scionable forfeiture to deprive the Defendants of their 
equity in the property and denied restitution of the 
premises to the Plaintiffs. The Court concluded that the 
Plaintiffs were not entited to treble damages, that the 
Plaintiffs were entitled to $500.00 attorney's fees, plus 
costs, and that the Plaintiffs were entitled to enteT judg-
ment against the Defendants for $1,128.23. The 
fendants were admonished to refinance the property to 
pay the Plaintiffs on said judgment and, upon payment 
thereof, the Plaintiffs were directed to deed the property 
to the Defendants (R. 59-61). 
After Judge Hanson had made his initial decision, 
and after he had caused said decision to be reduced to 
writing, signed same, and caused it to be filed with the 
clerk's office, then the tenacious litigants and lawyers 
engaged in numerous motions, arguments, and the appli-
cation of much pressure. Preliminary entreaties were 
rnade of the Court and the Court then seemed to yield 
to the pressure, finally allowing counsel for the Plain-
8 
i 
tiffs to submit Findings of Fact and Conclu:-;ions of La'.'· 
1 
and a Judgment, but consistent with tlw views of 
for the Plaintiffs, rather tl1an with the l\frmoranrlm:i 
Decision. Said Findings of Fact, Condusious of La11. 
and Judgment were in fact prepared and snhmitted t11 
the Court and sigrn·d li>· tlw Conrt and fikd in the dPrk" 
office on Augnst :25, 19G9 ( R. G5-69). After 
objections and arguments were made, thP. Conrt dirPc\11. 
Mr. Farr to prepare final Findings, Conelu:,;ions, an1I 
Judgment. On September :23, 1969, this author callel 
Mr. Farr and advised him that he had received check> 1· 
from the Defendanb, amounting to $:2,000.00 and tl1a: 
consistent with the Memorandum Decision, the Defend· 
ants would pay $1,233.90 as the original amount of th1 
judgment, plus costs of $22.40, and attorney's fees 01 
$500.00 for a dismissal of the casP. without an>· frn1h1: 
proceedings, and for a deed to the property in question 
'l'his off er of settlement was flatly rejected by the Plaw 
tiffs and their attorney. 
Finally, the complete about-face was completed b! 
the Court in the entrv of final Findings of Fact, Con . 
clusions of Law, and .Judgment, on September 25, u 
(R. 101-06), though the second set of Findings, Cnn 
clusions and Judgment was at variance from the firstsr·'. 1 
which is on file herein. Mr. Farr then proceeded in: I 
mediately to obtain a \\Trit of Restitution on the 2Gth
011
' I 
of 1969 (R 19-20), and before any ,. 
. . 1 c1 t l ad been given to this author that t ie ;our 1 · 
judgment in this c&8'' (R. 107), and that the Defendtlnl I 
l 
,p] 
lli 
·' " 
if 
!ii 
"I ,, 
n I 
i 
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were in a perilous situation. Defendanfa were afforded 
no opportunity to make any objections to the final Find-
ings, Conclusions, and Judment, and were afforded no 
opportunity to have a bond fixed h:- the lower court to 
stay execution on the Judgment. 'J1lie appeal then fol-
lowed. 
ARGUMENTS 
POINT I 
THE APPELLATE COURT IS REQUIRED TO PASS 
UPON THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE. 
Since the Plaintiffs in this case sought enforcement 
of the contractual provisions which pe.rmit a forfeiture 
the Defendants of amounts paid on the contract, and 
which permit the Plaintiffs the right to re-enter and to 
re-take possession of the premises, rather than seeking 
monetary damages, this case is one ordinarily cognizable 
in equity, rather than in law. In such cases, the appel-
late court is required to consider the entire record and 
pass upon the weight of the evidence. Croft v. Jensen, 
86 Utah 13, 40 P.2d 198, 203 (Utah, 1935); Cline v. Hul-
lnm, 435 P .2d 152, 154 (Okla., 1967). It is respectfully 
submitted that the weight of the admissable competent 
evidence in this case is inconsistent with the conclusions 
reached by the lower court in several respects, and these 
inconsistencies will be reviewed with particularity in the 
arguments hereinafter to follow. 
10 
POINT II 
THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT 
SUPPORT THE LOWER COURT'S CONCLUSION 
THAT DEFENDANTS WERE IN DEFAULT ON 
THE UNIFORM REAL ESTATE CONTRACT. 
The Uniform Real Estate Contract in this case lll'O· 
vides that where the seller maintains a loan secured b) 
a mortgage against the property that "when the printi· 
pal [amount outstanding and due on the contract] ha, 
been reduced to the amount of the loan and mortgage, 
the seller agrees to convey and the buyer agrees Iii 
accept title to the above-described property subject to 
said loan and mortgage." (R. 3) The Plaintiffs semd 
the Defendants a Notice to Pay or Quit on March 12, 
1968 (R. 5). On March 18, 1968, the outstanding balance 
owing on the mortgage against the premises by Plaintiffa 
to Doxey-Layton Company was in the amount of 
1 
(R. 223, Ex. 31-D). The balance owing by : 
to Plaintiffs on the Contract as of March 5, 1968, accord· 
ing to the final accounting done by Lionel M. Farr, 
attorney for Plaintiff 8, as adjusted for conceded error ' 
of January 5, 1968, was $4,102.46 (Ex. 42-P). Defend· 
ants respectfully submit that the weight of the evidenr.e 
supports the conclusion that the corrected contract bal· 
ance as of March 5, 1968, should have been $3,350.41 
( app. III). Although the Blauer Accounting, as adjuste: 
for an error made on the transaction of January 5, 
indicates that the Contract balance as of March 12, 19681 
was $2,792.91 (Ex. 32-D), an adjustment thereof, con· 
. . th 1 . d . A a·x III would ' sistent with e ana ys1s ma e m ppen I ' . 
make the contract balance $3,421.45. Accordingly, it 1' 
; 
I 
I 
.....ill 
11 
apparent that the net difference between the accountings 
of Lionel M. Farr and Lorin R. Blauer is de minimus. 
In support of the foregoing observation that De-
fendants are entitled to additional credits, over and above 
those given in the Farr and Carroll Accountings, a brief 
review of the record, and the reasons in support of De-
fendants' contentions, will hereinafter be set forth, as 
follows: 
1. rrhe Defendants produced an original receipt 
dated February 25, 1955, which indicated Phil Birdsall 
made a $25.00 payment on the 1315 Gillespie property 
(the subject property), and said receipt was signed by 
W. E. Carroll (Ex. 15-D). The receipt was admittedly 
in Carroll's handwriting (R. 169). The receipt by its 
very appearance is old, and certainly is entitled to the 
equal dignity of the original accounting record of Mr. 
Carroll (Ex. 4-P). Mr. Carroll, in t'xplaining Exhibit 
22-P, indicated that he made an entry as of March 7, 
1955, and then remembered that the payment had been 
made February 23, 1955. Accordingly, he scratched 
March 7, 1955, and wrote in February 23, 1955, which 
he would have the Court believe was the same payment 
as that represented by the receipt of February 25, 1955 
(R. 178-79). It seeins incredible to this author that Mr. 
Carroll would have such an amazing memory at date of 
trial, but would register such uncertainty back in 1955, 
Which conclusion is fairly deducible from the question 
inark next to the March 7 entrv on Exhibit 22-P. Surely 
Mr. Carroll would have had a. copy of the February 25, 
12 
1955, receipt in hif' re-ceipt hook which wonlcl haw Jiei. 
mitted him to adjust the original n·cord, had such an 
adjustment been "·ananterl. at th<' tiilll'. .Aecortlingh, 
it is respectfully submitted that tlw duly authenticated 
receipt is evidencl:' of a quality sufficient to allow addi. 
tional credit to the Defendants over and ahore that 
given in Plaintiffs' o;:iginal accounting (Gx. ±-P). Sntl1 
receipt, standing relatively unimpeached, shonld he 
accepted by the Court as the weightier evidl·nce. 
2. 'l'he Defendants produced a cancelled check dated 
.J annary 10, 1958, made payable to Wayne Carroll b1 
:M:. La Verne Birdsall in the amount of $35.00 (Ex. lG-Di, 
which was admittedly endorsed by Carrol! (R. l!i5). 
'l'he Carroll Accounting included $35.00 payments for 
J annary 6, and January 29, but failed to inelude a pay 
ment for .Jannary 10 (J1Jx. 6-P). Mr. Carroll proffereJ 
Exhibits 23-P an<l 24-P as evidence that tlw .January JO, 
1958, check had bounced. He testified that Exhibit 2:J.P 
was for the same check numbl:'r and in the same amonnL 
hut said Exhibit does not identify check number 151 (R 
181). Moreover, said chargehack slip is dated January 
10, 1958, and it seems very unlikely that tlw hank would 
make the ehargebaek the sanw day that the check \Ilk 
given by the Defendants to the Plaintiffs. Exl1ibit ; 
also fails to identify check number 151 of .Tanuan lll, 
. . . · · ·t· llY that 1958, and Carroll frankly admitted m his tes nno . 
he did not know what happened during that period of 
January (R. 181). An examination of 01 ' • 
closes that the check was honored by the bank. It noi 
J 
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stamped "Heturn to Sender" or ''lrnmfficient Funds," 
cwd there is no other indication that the check bounced. 
Since Carrolls adduced no evidence id(•ntifying this check 
as not having been properly honored, or any evidence to 
create any disbelief that Defendants had in fact made 
of January 10, it is submitted that the check 
is the weightier evidence. Therefore, Defendants should 
be entitled to a credit for this payment. 
3. 'L'he Carroll Accounting did not provide an addi-
tion for taxes on November 30, 1960, in the amount of 
$133.98 (Ex. 7-P). Mr. Farr submitted interrogatories 
to the Defendants, in which he set forth a schedule of 
real estate taxes on the subject property (R. 27). He 
requested that the De.fendants admit the correctness of 
sucl1 schedule, and the Defendants did admit that the 
schedule of taxes was in fact correct (R. 31). However, 
the answer to the interrogatory in no way admitted that 
the Plaintiffs had paid the taxes, and were not reim-
bursed by the Defendants. Mrs. Barbara Place of Doxey-
Layton Company testified that Doxey-Layton had paid 
the taxes ewry year the contract was in force (R. 224). 
Based upon the answers to the interrogatories, Mr. Farr 
look the liberty of adding said amount in his accountings, 
which were received into evidence, notwithstanding the 
lack of proper foundation, qualification, and considering 
tliat they were nothing more than hearsay evidence. The 
Defendant Phil M. Birdsall testified that he paid the 
every year (R. 209), and the fact that Defendants 
reimbursed Plaintiffs for tax<c>s is somewhat corrobor-
14 
atoo by a notation on Exhibit ()_p which tliat 
the 1958 taxes 1\·ere paid, although said acconnting did 
not have a formal rntry of the paymrnt of such taxes. 
The Defendant Phil l\I. Birdsall further indicah·<l that lit 
paid the taxes in cash ( R. 210). Mr. Carroll tPstifieil 
that the exclusion of tlie taxes from the aeeounting waf 
an oversight, and should have been included (R. 2711, 
without there being any specific testimony or c•vid(·nct 
of how he could haYe vossibly remembered snch a thing 
for so many years hack. Judge Hanson had ('arlier com-
mented in the trial that he didn't think that it \ms proper 
for Mr. Farr to vary the orig·inal accounting recordi 
(R. 155). Where, as in this case, there is an original 
accounting record, which is of ancient origin and there 
is no similar documentary evidence of Pqual 
and no othe1 s1Jecific testimony or evidence which identi-
fies the particular transaction in question, it would seem 
to this author gross error to permit a rnriance from 
the original Canoll Accounting. 
4. Exhibit 9-P of Plaintiffs' orig·inal al'eonnting 
records contains a credit to thP Ddendants tor a $150.0I! 
payment on J nne 20, 1964. Mr. Farr introdncPd Exhibit 
25-P, which is a had from Defendant Phil Birdiall 
to Wayne Carroll in the amount of m: jnstifica 
tion for crediting the DPfendants with a payment of il]ll: 
$106.75 on that 1-iarticular datP. Mr. Canol111e\·er real], 
tied the bounced check in with anv evidem·<·, and 
113
' 
certainly very indPfinite as to whethe>r or not the cheet I 
l ld l ' l d l k (l->. 189-). n_'}1c boiuii'l'd s 1ou iave oeen c iarge )ac _, u 1 
If) 
diook might have been for taxes and insurance, and later 
could have been redeemed by the Defendants for cash, 
or any number of things could hav0 possibly happened. 
Moreover, it would have been very simple for Mr. Carroll 
to have made a reversing entry on his accounting records. 
Accordingly, it is submitted that the original accounting 
record is the best evidence available to the Court, and 
without a much stronger showing by the Plaintiff, the 
lower court should have been eompelled to give the 
appropriate weight to the original accounting record of 
the Plaintiffs. 
5. On November 30, 1965, Mr. Farr again took the 
liberty of adding $189.61 for 1965 taxes, notwithstanding 
the fact that Mr. Carroll had not charged this amount 
lo the Defandants in his original accounting (Ex. 10-P). 
Mr. Carroll testified that said taxes should have been 
entered on the record, but were not because of an over-
sight (R. 271). He again failed to give any reasons for 
the oversight, or any compelling testimony which should 
be of sufficient weight to vary from the original account-
ing record which he made at the time of the transaction. 
The reasons set forth above as to ifom 3 apply with 
equal force to Mr. Farr's deviation from the original 
record in this instance. 
6. On December 16, 1966, the Defendants purchased 
a tape recorded for the Plaintiffs. The Defendants ob-
tained said tape recorder from Semco, and no other items 
were purchased from Semco (R. 205-07 & 218-19). They 
[Jaid $103.50 for said tape recorder (Ex. 26-D). Mr. 
]( i 
Carroll testified th1J lie gave them crPdit for wltoba!P 
price (R. 11i(i), arnl tlwt am01rnt ,,a, 
(Ex. 10-P). However, there is no in the nt11rd 
to indicate other man that tlw J)<'frrnlants att11 
paid $10:L)O !'or ,-;aid taiw n·<'ord1·r. ,\1·eordingl1, 
the additional credit of $22.17 ought to bt• giwn tJ1P 
Defendants. 
7. It is the eontention of tlw Deit>nclants tl1at !1111 
payments in the amount of $125.00 werP made on Marcil 
13, 1967, but that the Plaintiffs only gav1· en"dit for 
payment (Ex. 10-P). 19-D eontai11s of 
two receipts e\·id<'ncing two payments: H<'cPipi No. 
to Phil Birdsall for pa,rnwnt of $1 :23.00 :-;igill'd 11« 
Mary W. Carroll, and Receipt No. OU7fi tu J'hil BirJ,aD 
for $125.00 was initiak·d \Vay1w K Canoll (Rm 
73). Mr. Carroll testified that only 01w payrn1·nt "':J' 
made on that datP, ai1d explained that l1is \rifr 11cnall.1 
wade tlw and n-'ceipts \\'<']'(' made up at tit" 
1'arne tim<'. \VlH'n lw "·ent to make up a de11osit on tlu; 
occasion, he started to write a receipt and didn 'i 
<l11plil'ak until aft(•r the n·<·Pipt \\<lS partialJ)· Jllilil' 
out ( R. 177). 1-fo also testified that the 
BishojJ the l\lar<'li, April and ::\In.\ pa,rnwnt' fi1; 
19G7, and that he had enter<'<l crt'cli t 011 Jii:-; ;H·r'<•i!Jltin: 
card for said paymrnb (R. 178, & Ex. ±1-1'). In adili 
tion, he testifi<'d that neithPr of the original t't'1'·1'1J1'' 
were given to the Birdsalls (R. 273). However. dw 
· . (' .. j I j • d nt ru11lili author woukl <lll<"st1011 why Mr. a110 ta ll 
J7 
the improper receipt, if in fact it was duplication. Mr. 
Birdsall testified on February 22, 1967, he was admitted 
to the hospital, and that he had bePn somewhat delinquent 
rlnring this period of time. As a result, Mr. Carroll would 
not accept a single payment on this particular occasion 
(R. 277). This is corroborated by Mrs. Birdsall's testi-
mony to the effect that then• had been several occasions 
on which double payments had bef'n re(f uired (R. 219). 
Mr. Birdsall testified that Carroll had done this many 
times, and that the Defendants would have to bring back 
more money on the same day in order to satisfy Mr. 
Carroll (R. 207-08). It is respectfully submitted that the 
weight of the evidence would justify the Court's allowing 
an additional credit of $125.00 to the Defendants. 
Assuming that this Court reaches the same conclu-
sion as this author, or makes a similar determination 
which concludes that the mortgage balance of March 12, 
1968, exceeded the balance due Plaintiffs by the De-
fendants on the Uniform Real Estate Contract in ques-
tion, then it would be the Plaintiffs who ·were in default 
on the Contract, rather than Defendants. In such an 
event, the Plaintiffs were obliged by the contractual 
terms to convey the property to the Defendants, subject 
to the mortgage. Even though the Plaintiffs have con-
tinued to make mortgage payments after the initiation 
of the repossession proceedings such that the mortgage 
balance now has been reduced below the contract balance 
on March 12, 1968, it seems that they cannot 
now be heard to complain, since tlwy refused to receive 
any more monthl:v payments from tlte 011 t, 
they had ini tiah·d said proceedings. It is, 
respectfuly submitted that the lo\\'\ol' court granl('cl in 
appropriate relief by allowing restitution of tlte lHemi'e' 
to Plaintiffs, by quieting title in them arnl by allrl\\iH, 
the Plaintiffs rents and treble damages, and eosb u! 
the proceeding. Defendants suggest that thP Court ohu11ld 
compel the Plaintiffs to deed tlw propert.1· tu the De 
fondants, allow the Defendants a reasonalJle attorne.1'i 
fee for the handling of this case, includiug the appeal, 
consistent with the evidence in the record (H. 2(i3), and 
costs of these proceedings. As to any arnmmt by \\'hieh 
the mortgage balance might now be reduced bclO\r the 
contract balance as of March 12, 1%:-\, the Court 10lwnltl 
first allow the Defendants to off-set the awanlt>d attor-
ney's fee ao·ainst anv deficiencv creah·d Irr eo11ti111tl'd b • J • 
payments on the mortgage by the Plaintiffs. Unless tlH 
Plaintiffs have 13aid the mortgage in fnll, there is still 
an outstanding balance thereon whid1 approxiwate' 
$2,700.00, thus creating a deficiency bdow thl' :Jlarcl1 e 
1968 contract balanee of only apprnxirnatei>· 
which amount the attorney's fee slwnld more than ark 
quately off-set. f-Jhould the Court reach a diffrn•nt coi: 
clusion, there is on file with the Salt Lake County Clerk.' 
office a cash bond in the amount of $1,500.00 wl1id1 eonld 
be used bv the Court to adj nst any rmnaining prohiellti 
· · · · tf lh ,uli (R. 131-32). Howeyer, the Defrndants respc·c 1l . ' 
mit that those fonds ought to be rdnrned to the De 
fendants at the conclusion of this ease. 
l!l 
POINT III 
EVEN THOUGH THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE 
SUPPORTS THE LOWER COURT'S CONCLUSION 
THAT THE DEFENDANTS WERE IN DEFAULT 
ON THE UNIFORM REAL ESTATE CONTRACT, IT 
WAS IMPROPER FOR THE LOWER COURT TO 
PERMIT A FORFEITURE OF THE UNIFORM REAL 
ESTATE CONTRACT BY THE DEFENDANTS. 
It is '•t]Je dnty of the Court to dPtermine whether 
ito offae:o are heing used to exact an unconscio11able 
11 q11il!n1c1it or amowzt." (Emphasis added.) Perkins v. 
Sv11cer, 121 Utah -!GS, 243 P.2d 4-±G, 452 (Utah, 1952). 
It i::; "tl1e of the eourt to determine ·whether 
of the home and started for it in July 
of 1954. They made payments thereon, although some-
tunps sporadically, all during the veriod of time from 
195± until tl1e Plaintiffs initiated repossession proceed-
mgs in this case. Even by the most liberal interpretation 
of the evidence in favor of the Plaintiffs, the Defendants 
had paid approximately two-thirds of the original pur-
thase price of $11,950.00. Commencing in September of 
lUGl, the• Dc·fendants started paying payments of $150.00 
(Ex. 8-P), in an effort to bring delinquent payments 
current on the Contract in question. Had the Defendants 
LiPn ]JPrmitted to continue monthy payments of $150.00 
lil'f month, as ·was demanded in the first notice of the 
l'lamtiffs, any delinqtwneies soon would have been cor-
ll'ded, and tl10 contract balance would havt> been liqui-
rlated in a relatively short fone. Moreover, when one 
·rin,;iiJ1·r." that thP Plaintiffs om•d Doxey-Layton Com-
Jlilll)' on a mortgage against the property, and 
that the contract balance, at best, was no more thai' 
$4,102.46, when Plaintiffs first gave notiri. 
according to the final accounting of Mr. Farr, the Plain 
tiffs' equity in the property could have been no mon 
than $455.07. By comparing the equity figure with tJ
1
, 
original purchase price, it is clearly seen that the Plain 
tiffs had less than 4% of their contract price which tlM 
had not yet received, either by way of vayments fromth1 
Defendants, or by way of monies received from a mort 
gage which they had placed against the property. 
Also, when one reviews all of the additional credit 
which were given by the Plaintiffs to Defondants, after 
the various accountings were made in this case (app.li. 
there seems to be reasonable merit in the position Wien 
by Defendants at tl1e outset of this case; i.e., their re· 
quest for a complete accounting in an effort to re<:-0ncil1 
differences between the parties before legal action wa: 
commenced, and their imtting Plaintiffs on notice of th1 
definite disagn'ement with the results of the Carroll 
Accounting. In addition, there are the other items 01 
transactions for the Court's consideration which tlfi 
catalogued in Appendix II and Appendix TJI and whict 
are argued at length in Point II hereinabove. With aii 
of the variances, discrepancies, and errors which hart 
been brought to light as a result of these proceeding" 
certainly the Conr-t must conclude that the Ddendani' 
were well within their right to demand and exprd :: 
. f' d ww thorough accounting hPfore any additwnal un s .. 
paid the Plaintiffs, or they could mah any dPtl'I 
I 
i 
I _......... 
I 
i 
I ... 
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rnination as to -what their conn;e of action should be 
a' a result of tlte Notice to Pay or Quit and the Notice 
to Quit in this case. 
'L'he granting by the lower comt of immediate resti-
tution of th(• property to the Plaintiffs was most cer-
tainly an ''unconscionable requirement" within the mean-
ing and spirit of the Perkins case, supra, and, specifically, 
would violate the self-imposed limits of power the Courts 
are willing to exercise as was very ably expressed by the 
lafi> Chief .T11stice Wolfe in his concurring opinion in the 
hrkins l'ase, siipra, at page ±53: 
tTnconscionableness may b<> prPsent at the mak-
ing of tlw contract or it may arise at the time 
of default or time of enforcement. But courts 
inhere11tly han· the lHl\\'Pr to refm;e to lend them-
selves to unconscionable acts. All that is required 
is that the courts, when asked to enforce an uncon-
scionable provision in a contract, refuse to do so 
because at the time the enforcement is asked it 
would be unconscionable to do so . 
. fudge Hanrnn certainly recognized this principle as he 
mdicated S!'Veral times throughout the trial that resti-
tution would be unconscionable, and lw demonstrated his 
1·11mictions by his written Memorandum Decision. How-
1·Yer, 11ith the exertion of much pressure, he was im-
Jiropc·rly persnaded to retreat from a decision that he 
had made, with a view to fundamental fairness and jus-
tice. 
Althongh fop Perkins east>, s11prn, differs signifi-
i·antly in its fact situation from the case before the 
22 
Court, the case of Croft v. Jensen, 86 Utah 13, 40 P.1n 
198 (Utah, 1935), is a reasonably analogous factual situ 
ation to the one before the Court. A real estate contrai·t 
jn the amount of $6,500.00 was involved, on which 
was an unpaid balance of $200.00. The facts of the Croft 
case differ from this case in that a tender of the 
eontract balance was made to the seller. HowPver. it 1, 
submitted that the uncertainty surrounding the contrai:i 
balance in tills case well justified the Defendants in not 
making a tender of the balance due under the contract 
At page 202, the court indicated that 
the paintiff was not entitled to declare a for. 
f eiture of the contract involved in this action. 
The limit and measurl' of her right to recom 
because the installments were not paid when 1111 
same became due was the am01unt of the in"tall-
mmzts together with legal interest thereon. (Em· 
phasis added.) 
110 maintain consistency with the Croft case, this Court 
must deny restitution, and award Plaintiffs the differ 
ence between the contract balance as of Mareh 12, 19(il 
and the mortgage balance as of this time. 
vV ere this Court to conclude that the Plaintilfs are 
entitled to a return of the property in question, thep, 
the Defendants surely are t>ntitled to a judgment 
upon the unenforceab.le or unconscionable forfeiture ron 
cept discussed throughout the Perkins case, supra. Dt 
fendants eontendPd, and add need direct in P
01111 
. f t1 propert1 thereon, that the reasonable rental value o ie 1 · · · i watr<l $1 , over tlrn period of tiuw m approx 
:i5o.oo. as opposed to the avproximate $17,000.00 they 
paid on the contract. (See app. I.) Although the Plain-
tiffa claimed the reasonable rental value to be $125.00 
1wr month, no competent evidence was adduced in sup-
1 
port of such a conclusion. Accordingly, Defendants 
,J10uld be entitled to a judgment against the Plaintiffs 
for approximately $6,000.00 for the payment of excess 
1ents, should this Court grant restitution. Moreover, it 
i' submitted that the Defendants should be entitled to a 
return of tlw $1,500.00 cash bond on file with the Salt 
Lake County Clerk's office, since a return of the property 
to the Plaintiffs in this case is a clear-cut windfall. Not 
only did they effectively have little equity in the prop-
trty, hut the present real estate market has undoubtedly 
treated a situation in which the Plaintiffs would receive 
a property greatly appreciated in price and value. 
POINT IV 
ONCE THE TRIAL COURT HAD MADE ITS DE-
CISION, IT WAS IMPROPER FOR SAID TRIAL 
COURT TO RECONSIDER THAT DECISION. 
Although the case of Drury v. Lumceford, 18 U.2d 
i4, 415 P.2d 662 (Utah, 1966), considered the finality 
of an order given as a result of a motion, and was not 
eoncerned ·with the decision rendered by a court after 
!rial, such ease has application to the case now before 
the Court. At page 663 of the opinion, the now Chief 
,Jnstice Crockett indicated that once the lo-wer court had 
111ade its decision, that then completed both the duty 
and Prerngatiw of said court. Although the opinion does 
l!otdefine what constitutes a "dt>cision," Defendants con-
tend that the l\frmorandum Dt>cision of Judge Hanso
11 
which ·was signed and filed with the Cl('rk on ,Ju]y 2, 1911!1 
constitutes such a decision within the spirit and 
of the holding of the Drury case, sitpra. The wry dan 
gers and problems thought to be put to rrst by !h1 
Drury holding are conspicuously present in the me 
before the Court, sincp Judge Hanson thereafter signtJ 
and filed two separate sets of Findings, Conclusions ann I 
Judgments. Such final pleadings are at variance, ana 
there is no clear indication in the record which set oi 
final pleadings was intended by the lowt'r court to bt 
the final decision. 
POINT V 
THE AWARD OF TREBLE DAMAGES BY THE 
LOWER COURT WAS IMPROPER. 
Section 78-36-G, LTtah Code Annotated 1953, pr011de1 
that the notice r<"'quir<:'d in a forcible entr)T and 
action must be servPd in a particular way or wa)i. 
Where, as in this case, the tenant is absent from Jui 
place of residence, or from his usual place of husinrs;, 
"a copy of such notice may be left with a person °1 
of suitable age and discretion at Pither plac<', and a cop: 
thereof must be mailed to the tenant at his place of rrsi 
. f' 8 rvice of dence or place of busrness." The Return o k e . 
the Notice to Pay or Quit, as to Defendant Phil M. Bir.a 
sail indicates that a co1)Y thereof was left with his 
' • 'l d (l' 
but it failed to certify that a copy of same was wai e. 
I ddiltuil I the Defendant Phil M. Birdsall (R. G). n a 
1 
said notice demanded the full payment of the delinqnen I 
lmlaitcP, which was substantiall)' m error, and put De-
fi·ndants on notict: that the contract balance was $4,-
i±O . .J-4, qnite a bit more than was due to Plaintiffo on 
Ow Contract. :Moreover, the noticP mad<> a demand for 
an attorney's foe of $475.50, whiC'h, any standard, is 
an outrageous fee for the preparation of such a notice, 
and for thP services which are attendant therewith. Cer-
tainly, snch a notice cannot be permitted to stand where 
it; dPrnand:; are improper and unlawful. 'rhe Defendants 
ai,ertPd the invalidity of the notices in their 
answer (R. 9 and 11). The ca:se of Van Zyverden v. 
Farrar, 15 U.2d 3G7, 393 P.2d 468, 470 (Utah, 1964), 
sptlls out the fact that a preliminary notice is required 
to place the buyer in the status of a tenant at will, and 
until that is done, the buyer would not be amenable to 
the notice provided in Section 78-36-3, Utah Code Anno-
tated. Unless there has been strict compliance with these 
requirements, then the forcible entry and detainer action 
does not lie. Since the Plaintiffs in this ca:se failed to 
0tri0!ly comply with the service requirements as to De-
fendant PhH M. Birdsall, forcible entry and de-
tainer action does not lie against him. 
The Perkins case, sitprn, at page 449, has met the 
rery problem before this Court. Mrs. Perkins had been 
t:ernonally served, and a copy of the notice had been 
with Mrs. Perkins for Mr. Perkins. However, no 
eu]J) was mailed to Mr. Perkins. 'rhis Court, through 
Justirt> CroekPtt, concluded that since Mr. Perkins was 
111 possession, the continued possession by Mrs. PPrkins 
could resnlt in no additional damagt> to 8penctc•rs. Ewri 
though the trial court awarded treble damages as against 
Mrs. Perkins, the Utah Supreme Court reversed, anddt-
clined to allow treble damages as to either person. TlMt 
fore, the Carrolls are not entitled to treble damage' in 
this case, as to either of the Defendants. 
CONCLUSION 
Passing upon the weight of the evidence in the 
ord, as this Court must, the conclusion that the Defend-
ants were not in default on the U nifonu Real Estate 
Contract is amply supported hy the weight of the evi-
dence. Accordingly, restitution of the property to !lw 
Plaintiffs is improper. 
Even though this Court concludes that the weight ol 
the evidence supported the conclusion of the lower court 
that the Defendants were in default on the U nifonn Real 
Estate Contract, the evidence in this case is 8uch that 
the allowance of restitution of the pro1wr-ty to tlw Plain-
tiffs shocks the conscience, and such a remedy to the 
Plaintiffs is an unconscionable forfeitnrr, and Bho1tld bt 
disallowed. 
It is respectfully submitted that this Conrt must 
reverse the lowt>r cou.rt and the case should be rpmanded 
f f. h d. 'I. with to the lower court or urt er procee mgs "' 
the opinion of the appellate court. 
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Costs and an attorney's fee should be awarded 
,\ endants. 
Respectfully :-;ubmitted, 
KENNETH RIGTRUP 
466 East 5th South, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Counsel for Appellants 
APPENDIX I 
Payments required of Defendants under the terms of the 
Uniform Real Estate Contract of July 1, 1954, between the 
parties, from inception of the confract to and including the 
12th day of March, 1968, the date on which Plaintiffs insti-
tuted repossession action in this case (R. 3): 
Year Required yearly payments 
1954 -----------------------------------$ 1,000.00 
1955 ------------------------------------ 1,200.00 
1956 ------------------------------------ 1,200.00 
1957 ------------------------------------ 1,200.00 
1958 ----------------------------------- 1,200.00 
1959 ------------------------------------ 1,200.00 
1960 ------------------------------------ 1,200.00 
1961 ---------------------·------------- 1,200.00 
1962 ----------------------------------- 1,200.00 
1963 ------------------------------------ 1,200.00 
1964 ----------------------------------- 1,200.00 
1965 ----------------------------------- 1,200.00 
1966 ------------------------------------ 1,200.00 
1967 ------------------------------------ 1,200.00 
1968 ------------------------------------ 300.00 
Total required payments 
under Contract to date 
repossession proceedings 
instituted ----------------------------$17,000.00 
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Payments made by Defendants to the Plaintiffs as per Farr 
Accounting No. 1 (Ex. 11-P): 
1954 ------------------------------------$ 
Hl55 -----------------------------------
1956 ------------------------------------
1957 -----------------------------------
1958 ------------------------------------
1959 ------------------ --------- ---------
1960 ------------------------------------
1961 ------------------------------------
1962 ------------------------------------
1963 . -----------------------------------
1964 ------------------------------------
1965 ------------------------------------
1966 -----------·----- ---------------·--· 
1967 ----------------------------------
1968 ------------------------------------
Total payments - Farr 
300.00 
906.08 
1,049.02 
1,308.92 
1,313,86 
1,256.12 
635.00 
1,146.37 
1,800.00 
1,652.40 
1,474.31 
1,552.70 
1,281.33 
1,200.00 
150.00 
Accounting No. 1 --------------$17,026.11 
:m 
Payments made by Defendants to Plaintiffs as per Farr 
Accounting No. 2 (Ex. 42-P): 
Year Amount 
1954 ----·-----------------------------$ 
1955 -----------------------------·-·-· 
1956 -----------------------------------
1957 ------------------------------------
1958 ·-----------------------------------
1959 ----------------------------------
1960 ----------------------------------
1961 ------------------------------------
1962 -----------------------------------
1963 ----------------------------------
1964 -------·-----------------------··· 
1965 -------·-·······-------------------
1966 ····-------·-·····--···-·---·-····· 
1967 ·------------···-·-·········--------
1968 -·····-·····-·····--------------·-· 
Total payments - Farr 
300.00 
916.08 
986.51 
1,336.43 
1,298.86 
1,206.12 
735.00 
1,146.37 
1,650.00 
1,803.20 
1,457.69 
1,418.54 
1,275.78 
1,281.33 
225.00 
Accounting No. 2 ··········--·-$17,036.91 
:n 
Payments made by Defendants to the Plaintiffs as per 
original Carroll Accounting (EiXs. 4-P through 10-P) : 
Year Amount 
1954 --------- -- --·----------------------$ 300.00 
951.08 
1,022.83 
1,238.92 
1,194.40 
1,150.00 
1955 -- ---- ---- --- ---- ---- ------- ---- -- -
1956 ------ -- --- -- ------- ----- -- -- -- -
1957 -------- ---------------------------
1958 ------ -------- ---- --- --------------
1959 ------ ---- ---- --- -- -- ---------------
1960 ----- ------ --- --- -- ---------------- -
1961 ------- ----------------------- -----
1962 -- ---------------------------------
1953 ------- --- ----- ----·-·--------- -----
1964 --------· ----·--·------------- --- -- -
1965 --- -- ---- ---·---------· ---- ----- --- -
1966 ----· -- -- --------- ------------ ---- -
1967 ------- -----·---· -- -· ---- ---- ------ -
1968 ----- --- ·----------------- --·-------
Total payments - Carroll 
Accounting ----·----------·--------
585.00 
1,196.37 
1,800.00 
1,652.40 
1,650.93 
1,350.84 
1,281.33 
1,125.00 
150.00 
$16,649.10 
Plus: Additional payments Plaintiffs stipulated Defena. 
ants paid Plaintiffs, and which were not included in tne 
Carroll Accounting (these are credited in Ex. 11-P, Farr 
Accounting No. l, consistent with the oral stipulation en-
tered between respective counsel): 
Date Payment 
12/31/56 (R. 149-50) ........ $ 26.19 
35.00 
35.00 
1/6/57 (R. 148 & 164) ..... . 
2/6/57 (R. 148 & 165) _____ _ 
2/17/59 (R. 149 & 164) ... . 
1/16/60 (R. 149 & 164) ... . 
2/25/63 (R. 149 & 164) ... . 
1/27/65 & 2/7/65 
(R. 149 & Ex. 17-D) _____ _ 
5/6/65 (R. 149 & 165) _____ _ 
6/23/65 (R. 149 & 165) .... 
8/10/67 (R. 149) ----···----··· 
106.12 
50.00 
.80 
1.16 
75.14 
125.56 
75.00 
Total credits not received by 
Defendants in Carroll Accounting 
Total payments - Adjusted Carroll 
Accounting ·······-···------------
$ 527.97 
$17,179.07 
Payments made by Defendants to Plaintiffs, as per the 
Blauer Accounting (Ex. 32-D) : 
Year 
1954 ·····-·········-···········-------$ 
1955 ·-·············-··················· 
1956 ·-·--··-·····--···················--
1957 ·-------·--·-··--·--········--·-···· 
1958 ··--······--···----·--·-·-·········-
1959 ·······-·····-····-················· 
1960 ·····-······················-··-··· 
1961 ··-··············-·········--·-····-
1962 ·-····-·······················--···· 
1963 ---··-··············-··-··-········ 
1964 -····--·······-··-··-···-··········· 
1965 ···'·---·-········--···-············ 
1966 --·-·------··--··--·-····-------···· 
1967 ·-·'·-·······-·················-··· 
1968 ·····-··········-------------····--
Total payments - Blauer 
Amount 
670.00 
976.08 
1,022.83 
1,308.99 
1,330.46 
1,256.12 
635.00 
1,196.37 
1,800.00 
1,652AO 
1,650.94 
1,552.70 
1,303.50 
1,350.00 
150.00 
Accounting ·--·-·-------·---------·$17,855.39 
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Rents on property from July 1, 1954, possession 11 
and including March 31, 1968, based upon an $85.00 
month rental payment (Findings of Fact, R. 105, Par. 12) 
Year Amount 
1954 ------------------------------------$ 510.00 
1955 ------------------------------------ 1,020.00 
1956 ------------------------------------ 1,020.00 
1957 ------------- ---------------------- 1,020.00 
1958 ------------------------------------ 1,020.00 
1959 ------------------------------------ 1,020.00 
1960 ------------------------------------ 1,020.00 
1961 ------------------------------------ 1,020.00 
1962 ------------------------------------ 1,020.00 
1963 ------------------------------------ 1,020.00 
1964 ------------------------------------ 1,020.00 
1965 ----------------------------------- 1,020.00 
1966 ------------------------------------ 1,020.00 
1967 ----------------------------------- 1,020.00 
1968 ------------------------------------ 255.00 
Total rents property would 
have yielded to month of 
commencement of proceed-
ings @ $85.00 per month--$14,025.00 
Rents on property from July 1, 1954, possession date, to 
and including March 31, 1968, based upon a $70.00 per 
month rental payment (R. 204, & 217-18; and for evidence 
in support of Carroll conclusion that rental value was $125.00 
per month, see R. 159) : 
Year 
1954 - ----------------------------------$ 
1955 ------ --- ----- --- ----- --------------
1956 ------------------ ------------------
1957 ------------------------------------
1958 ------------------------------------
1959 -----------------------------------
1960 ------------------------------------
1961 ----- ----- ---- -- ----- -- ---- ---------
1962 ------------------------------------
1963 --- ---------------------------------
1964 -- ----------------------------------
1965 -------------- ----------------------
1966 ------------------------------------
1967 -------------- --- -------------------
1968 ----- -- ---------- ------ -- --------- --
Total rents property would 
have yielded to month of 
commencement of proceed-
Amount 
420.00 
840.00 
840.00 
840.00 
840.00 
840.00 
840.00 
840.00 
840.00 
840.00 
840.00 
840.00 
840.00 
840.00 
210.00 
ings @ $70.00 per month .. $11,550.00 
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APPENDIX II 
Contract and mortgage balances on March 12, 1968, tn' 
date of the service of the Notice to Pay or Quit (R. 4-6): 
Carroll Accounting (Ex. 10-P) _____ ----------$ 4,787.96 
Farr Account No. 1 (Ex. 11-P) __________________ 4,201.42 
Farr Account No. 2 (Ex. 42-P) ________________ *4,102.46 
Blauer Accounting (Ex. 32-D) ______________ **2,792.91 
Doxey-Layton Mortgage Balance 
(Ex. 31-D) --------------- --------------- ----- _ 3,647.39 
*The balance on the Farr Accounting No. 2 of $4,133.24 
was reduced by the amount of $30.78 consistent with the 
acknowledged error made by Mr. Farr in his Answers to 
Defendants' Objections (R. 96), which acknowledged that 
said accounting included an item for taxes for January 5. 
1958, in the amount of $16.75, plus applicable interest in the 
amount of $14.03 (R. 73). 
**The balance of the Blauer Accounting of $2,538.23 
was increased by the amount of $254.48 to correct the error 
made by Blauer on the entry of January 5, 1955, where 
$57.86 interest was deducted, rather than added (Ex. 32-D). 
The $254.48 adjustment was made by adding the $115.72 net 
error and the applicable interest or $138.76. 
VARIANCES BETWEEN ACCOUNTINGS 
Date Amount Carroll Farr Blauer 
7 /9/54 $170.00 Excluded Excluded Included 
11/5/54 16.43 Excluded Included Excludea 
2/25/55 25.00 Excluded Excluded Included 
1/10/58 35.00 Excluded Excluded Included 
5/16/58 16.60 Excluded Excluded Included 
11/30/60 133.98 Excluded Included 
6/2-0/64 43.25 Included Excluded Includ 
d Included Excluded 11/30/65 189.61 Exclude d • 
Excluded JnclU 12/16/66 22.17 Excluded d l 
Excluded Jnc!U f 1/9/67 150.00 Excluded 
. t ansaction' Payments, insurance, taxes, or other items or r rinti· 
in dispute which may alter the final results of the va · 1
1
. 
I 
0/ 
Evidence 
Date Explanation Amount *Interest Carroll Birdsall 
;/9/54 payment $170.00 $215.20 Exs. 27-P, Exs.14-D. 
39-P & 40-P. R. 204 & 213. 
R. 212, 267, 
& 269-70. 
11/5/54 insurance 16.43 36.49 Ex. 40-P. Ex. 4-P, 
proration R. 270-71. 22-P, & 27-P. 
R.277. 
!/25/55 payment 25.00 29.70 Ex.11-P, Ex.15-P. 
22-P & 42-P. R.163 & 169. 
R.178-77. 
1/10/58 payment 35.00 29.32 Exs. 23-P Exs.16-D 
& 24-P. & 6-P. 
R.181. R.164, 181, 
& 191. 
5/16/58 payment 16.60 13.15 Ex. P-2. Ex. P-3. 
11/30/60 taxes 133.98 72.79 R. 27, 31, Ex. 7-P. 
224 & 271. R.155 & 
209-10. 
Q/20/64 payment 43.25 10.61 Ex. 25-P. Exs. 9-P & 
11-P. 
R.183. 
i/27/6.5 payment 151.62 29.82 Exs. 20-P, Exs.18-D 
21-P. & 20-P. 
R. 175-76. 
il/30/65 taxes 189.61 27.34 R. 271. Ex.10-P. 
i2/16/66 tape 22.17 1.60 Ex.10-P. Ex. 26-D. 
recorder R.166. R. 205-07 & 
218-19. 
3/13/67 payment 125.00 7.05 Ex. 41-P. Ex.19-D. 
R.177-78 R.172-73, 
&273. 207-08, 219 
&277. 
bas' 'The above interest computations were compounded on a monthly 
bi' Arthur 0. Dummer, 3993 Milky Way Drive, Salt Lake City, 
h,actuary and vice-president of Beneficial Life Insurance Company. 
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APPENDIX III 
Defendants' -Appellants' submit that the weight of the 
dence in the record supports the conclusion that they ii! 
entitled to additional credits against the contract 
consistent with the following analysis: 
Balance Farr Accounting No. 2 - 3/12/68 ______ $4,102.G , 
Additional credits to which Defendants-
Appellants should be entitled: 
Date 
2/25/55 
1/10/58 
11/30/60 
6/20/64 
11/30/65 
12/16/66 
3/13/67 
Amount 
$ 25.00 
35.00 
133.98 
43.25 
189.61 
22.17 
125.00 
Interest 
$ 29.70 
2'9.32 
72.79 
10.61 
27.34 
1.60 
7.05 
$574.01 $178.41 
Less: combined principal and interest____________ -
Defendants'-Appellants' suggested contract 
balance on 3/12/1958 _______________________________________ .$ 
Less: Doxey-Layton mortgage balance - J 
3/12/68 3,641 I -------------------------------------------------------•·•······ -
Defendants' -Appellants' proposed overpayment 
by Defendants at date action commenced ________ $ 29'/J 
